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Abstract
The Islamic State (IS) declared the establishment of a Caliphate on June 29,
2014 in Mosul, Iraq. Since that declaration, IS has communicated a four-part
narrative to the global community through Dabiq magazine, its epublication. Each of the ten editions of Dabiq has provided insight into IS’s
aspirations and reinforced its message of rejecting post-colonial structures.
Critical to realizing its objective is establishing a foothold for the Caliphate
through jihad (holy war), establishing legitimacy through jamaah
(governance), achieving tawhid (unity), and expanding through hijrah
(immigration). Each publication contains these narrative elements to
document IS’s progress. Classifying, visualizing, and mapping will provide
the analytical insight necessary to quantify the prioritization of IS narrative
elements and identify the organization’s motivation.
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Introduction
Over the last 16 months, the Islamic State (IS) has successfully
demonstrated the ability to manage a multi-front conflict, generate billions in
revenue, expand the boundaries of the Caliphate, and, most surprisingly,
attract immigrants to the Caliphate. Much of its success is attributable to the
deliberate and consistent
employment of its religion-based
narrative. IS leaders are
methodically employing a
narrative to mobilize sympathetic
elements of the global Sunni Islam
population. They communicate
this narrative through official IS
media outlets, social media, and
micro blogging sites. Authors have
pedantically detailed the strategic
framework for this narrative in ten
editions of the Dabiq e-magazine.

The Original 1916 Pico-Sykes
Border: A goes to France, B goes
to Great Britain
Figure 1

Osman 2013

Each publication of Dabiq has
reinforced the call for jihad (holy war), establishing legitimacy through
jamaah (governance), achieving tawhid (unity), and expanding through
hijrah (immigration). IS leaders have systematically included geographic
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elements in the narrative to create a multi-generational conflict between
Islam and the Western world. The mobilization message within the narrative
calls for the destruction of idolatry, innovation, and post-colonial
structures—specifically the Pico-Sykes border between Iraq and Syria. Figure
1 illustrates the original 1916 Pico-Sykes border. Mark Sykes, representing
Great Britain, and Francois Georges-Picot, representing France, secretly
drew up the borders following World War I. In the agreement, France gained
control of the “A” area, or modern-day Syria, and Great Britain gained
control of the “B” area, or modern-day Iraq (Osman 2013). Fundamentally,
IS leaders designed the narrative to strengthen IS’s contiguous boundaries,
continue non-contiguous expansion, and encourage religious violence in
Western countries. Destruction of post-colonial structures, such as the PicoSykes border, is a method of strengthening IS while weakening post-colonial
structures. Physically removing the boundary between Iraq and Syria
represents a tangible and symbolic victory to further the IS narrative.
Brief History
One can trace the genealogy of radical Islam, and the sources of
inspiration for IS, to select traditions of Islamic jurisprudence. An
increasingly active vocalization advocating violence to achieve a political end
has allowed IS and its predecessor Al Qaeda (AQ) to persevere. On the
surface, IS and AQ are ideologically similar (Barret 2014). However, in
reality, their nuanced theological interpretations and geographic aspirations
10/3/2015
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place the organizations in diametric opposition. AQ’s interpretation of a
defensive jihad justifies the use of violence against non-believers and
colonial remnant governments. IS’s interpretations significantly overreach
AQ’s interpretation and advocates for an active jihad. Under this
interpretation, IS is compelled to cleanse its Caliphate of apostasy. By its
definition, apostates include tribalists, secularists, Shiites, and anyone who
rejects the legitimacy of the Caliph (Barret 2014).
IS’s declaration of a Caliphate is a paradigm-shifting event and a
serous departure from contemporary jihadist tradition. Establishing a
Caliphate has three preconditions and implications: (1) Recognizing the
legitimacy of a Caliphate compels loyal adherents to immigrate to its
boundaries, (2) maintaining the legitimacy of the Caliphate mandates the
enforcement of strict and medieval interpretations of Sharia law, and (3) the
larger the Caliphate grows, the longer it will endure, and the effectiveness
with which it enforces Sharia law will continue to inspire global support
(Barret 2014).
Benefit of the Research
Every combat commander from Sun Tzu through present-day military
strategists will affirm the necessity of understanding adversaries. In the
summer of 2014, the U.S. government significantly underestimated IS’s
resilience. The conventional wisdom at the time characterized IS as an AQ
jayvee team. In retrospect, that assessment was entirely inaccurate. Due to
10/3/2015
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this failure to fully understand the enemy, the U.S. government is still trying
to understand IS and the full potential of the threat it poses.
In an effort to better understand IS’s strategic ambitions, an analysis
of its primary means of communicating with people outside of the Caliphate
is of great importance. As of September 1, 2015, IS has published ten
editions of Dabiq to provide a step-by-step guide to supporters to join and
support the Caliphate. Each edition of Dabiq contains thematic indicators of
a unified narrative. Quantifying the value of each independent element may
serve as a point of focus for the development of counter messaging
strategies. Moreover, visualizing the spatial distribution of where narrative
elements are present may help to characterize IS’s political motivations. This
paper seeks not to fully understand IS and identify ways to defeat the
organization, but to provide practitioners and planners with a starting point
for classifying, quantifying, visualizing, and analyzing the temporal and
spatial components of IS narrative elements.
Preliminary Literature Review
A meaningful analysis of the IS narrative will require an
interdisciplinary research approach using primary and secondary source
data. As a starting point, research will be conducted across the topics of
geopolitics, narratology, propaganda, IS history, and cartography, as well as
a primary source evaluation of Dabiq magazine.
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Geopolitics
In the summer of 2014, IS gained control of mass swaths of Iraq and
Syria using blitzkrieg-like tactics (Price 2014). Its advances all had common
characteristics; they were swift, brutal, and predominantly in Sunni majority
communities. Its seemingly unstoppable tactical successes in Iraq led to the
nearly instantaneous collapse of the Iraqi Army (Price 2014). In
predominately historic Sunni strongholds, such as Ninewa Province, the
people offered little popular resistance. In some instances, the local
populace embraced IS as a liberating force (Barret 2014).
Areas in southern Iraq, such as Bagdad, with a higher Shia population,
provided a more unified defense against the initial IS onslaught. Areas in
northeastern Iraq, in what is frequently referred to as Kurdistan, provided
little tactical success for IS. The organization continues to meet strong
resistance from the local population. The Kurdish resistance forces have
been the primary ground force ally for the coalition-led efforts in Iraq and
Syria (Price 2014).
Following its immediate battlefield success, IS redoubled its efforts in
propaganda production. IS’s official media wing, Al-Hayat Media, began
producing Dabiq magazine to publicize its narrative in June 2014. The first
edition offered four critical narrative themes for continued success: jihad,
jamaah, tawhid, and hijrah. These themes appear to have particular
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religious meaning in the context of the contiguous area IS controls in Iraq
and Syria.
Beyond its stated aspirations of
building and growing a Caliphate
within captured areas of Iraq and
Syria, IS has global aspirations. IS
has published details on social media
of its five-year plan for expansion,

Islamic State 5 Year Plan
Figure 2

Martel 2015

which includes areas of North Africa,
the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Europe, and China (Martel 2015). Figure 2
shows a graphic allegedly posted to a Twitter account associated with the AlHayat Media Center. This image shows a very ambitious expansion plan that
is somewhat validated by subsequent expansion. This aspiration is supported
by the continual pledges of allegiance received from like-minded Islamist
organizations around the globe. To date, IS has accepted pledges of
allegiance from organizations with ties in Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia,
Russia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Egypt (Milton 2015).
Narratology
The study of narratology suggests that narratives are a basic and
constant form of human expression regardless of ethnic origin, primary
language, or enculturation (Barthes 1975). Narratives provide a linear
progression and sequence to link event actions in a discernable and
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repeatable format. According to the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field
Manual (FM), a narrative, “an organizational scheme expressed in story
form,” is central to insurgencies. Additionally, the FM highlights the role
narratives perform: They channel ideology, express collective identity, model
behavior, provide reasons for actions, and aid in interpreting others (Zalman
2008).
Across linguistic and cultural barriers are reoccurring commonalties in
successful narratives. Those narrative themes have been summarized as the
three main elements of a narrative (Van Dijk 1975):


Audience: Implies that the subconscious of the audience develops a
cognitive map of incoming information with the intention of recreation.
Fundamental to this logic is that the audience seeks to become the
narrator through including itself in the story.



Setting: A story must occur at a given time and place. Given humans’
struggle with spatial cognition, much of that information will be a
simplification. A narrative can summarize details and truncate times.



Plot: Events that happen in a story provide the basic framework for
the narrative. A good plot must have a beginning, middle, and end
that outlines a series of events. These events must follow each other
on a causal basis; it must make logical sense that one thing comes
after another.

10/3/2015

Bixler - 8

Each edition of Dabiq reinforces the IS narrative through calls to
action. According to IS’s ideological interpretation, the establishment of a
Caliphate morally compels adherents to immigrate to the Caliphate. If they
are unable to immigrate, they have the option of establishing a local
franchise or conducting attacks attributed to IS.
Propaganda
Propaganda is a complementary function to terrorism. The act of
terrorism is a highly choreographed event used by terror organizations to
communicate a message to a broader audience. This is an ideal example of
the metaphor of the “theater of terror” (Bueno et al. 2003). The “theater of
terror” explains that the attacks, and even the victims, may have little to do
with the motivation. In the modern age of propaganda, the goal of a terror
attack is to gain mass media coverage (Bueno et al. 2003).
A body of quantitative analysis examining propaganda content has
identified thematic elements in contemporary Islamist propaganda design. A
key element seen in nearly every jihadist media production is the
justification for the use of violence (Weiman 2008). Furthermore, in the
contemporary information environment, a qualitative assessment has
identified three coalescing strategic nuclei in messaging (Torres 2006):


Religious nucleus: Fundamental principles of the hyper puritanical
Salafist movement, including the need to return to the glory of the
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prophet and his companions as described in the Haditha and the
Quran.


Political nucleus: An agenda to re-establish the Caliphate, politically
uniting the countries with a Muslim majority and removing tyrants who
govern Muslim states.



Instrumental nucleus: The need to mobilize the Muslim world so it
can regain consciousness of its greatness and the humiliation it
suffers. This demands action on behalf of a vanguard of genuine
believers

A propaganda technique terrorist organizations commonly employ is the
projection of a Manichean world (O’Shaughnessy et al. 2009). They simplify
the worldview to good versus evil. Islamist propaganda makes no room for
negations, dissenting opinions, or compromise. Such propaganda allows for
only absolute elements and the apocalyptic inevitability of a clash between
Islam and the West.
IS: The Organization
The etymology of the name IS conveys an evolving geographic
ambition. That ambition has transitioned over time and represents a nuance
in its aspirational geographic intent. In 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the
original founder of what is now IS, pledged alliance to AQ leadership and
formed Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). The geographic ambition in that era was to
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form an Islamic Sunni State in western and central provinces of Iraq
(Fishman 2008).
AQ-I formed additional alliances in Iraq and transitioned into the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006. Shortly after its formation, U.S.
counterterror efforts killed Zarqawi and most of ISI’s top leadership (Barret
2014). The ISI leadership was eventually transferred to Abu Bakr al
Baghdadi, the current self-proclaimed leader of the Caliphate.
Under the leadership of Baghdadi, the
organization has taken on new ambitions
and grown significantly. His has consolidated
alliances with numerous Sunni factions in
Iraq and Syria, developed a globally
recognized brand of ultra-violent jihad, and

Note: The Levant and Sham
are both historic names
describing areas of modernday Iraq, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Israel. The
Islamists likely use these
terms to reinforce their
position on the illegitimacy of
post-colonial political
boundaries.

declared himself the Caliph (Barret 2014). Following this declaration, the
organization changed its name again, this time to the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL). An alternative translation yields the name the Islamic
State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). After months of battlefield success, and
expansion beyond the contiguous boundaries of Iraq and Syria, the name
changed again. The current name, IS, reflects the lofty ambitions of building
a Sunni Caliphate from North Africa to China. The capital of the Caliphate is
Dabiq, a city of historic and apocalyptic signification in northwestern Syria
(Adnani 2014).
10/3/2015

Bixler - 11

Cartography
Scholars, journalists, activists, lobbyists, individuals, and terrorist
organizations all exploit the narrative power of maps to tell non-fictional
stories as support tools in their research and to assist in developing
arguments about places. The potential of maps to both decipher and tell
stories is virtually unlimited (Carquard 2014).
Harley’s early work in cartography, the Second Text within Maps,
examines the relationships among political interests, power, and the hidden
agendas of maps. Harley argues that maps provide a powerful rhetoric and
can be critically examined as texts themselves. Overall, Harley concludes
that through map deconstruction one can read “in the margins of the text”
and identify contradictions to the apparent honesty of the image. Of equal
importance, Monmonier, in How to Lie with Maps, identifies challenges
associated with evolving digital cartographic practices and encourages
healthy skepticism by consumers.
Clearly, IS understands the value and power of including geographic
and cartographic elements in its propaganda publication. Nearly every
edition of Dabiq includes explicit examples of the use of maps or satellite
imagery. One of the clearest examples is the publication of its five--year
plan on Twitter (see Figure 2). The image is designed for maximum impact
for a very diverse audience. For IS’s followers, it is inspirational to see the
narrative in action for IS’s expansion. For the Western audience, the
10/3/2015
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intention is to instill fear and enhance the perception that IS remains
unstoppable.
IS has also routinely provided text-based descriptions of its expansion.
In each of the ten editions of Dabiq, IS has announced recent expansions
and administrative boundary revisions. IS refers to its administrative
structures, similar to provincial boundaries, as a wiliayats. Wiliayats are
contiguous within Iraq and Syria and non-contiguous across North Africa and
the Middle East. When IS announces a new administrative boundary, it
provides a relative description within the text of Dabiq. It describes the cities
or terrain features contained within the wiliayat. The contiguous boundaries
purposefully ignore the Pico-Sykes border and span areas within Iraq and
Syria. IS has yet to publish an official wiliayat map, but freelance journalists
are actively compiling the information and mapping their findings. The
boundaries used for this analysis were compiled by Alex Konstanos and
published on an open street map in google earth. The boundaries were
checked against the information in Dabiq for consistency.
Design and Implementation
Data Sources
The primary data source for this analysis is IS’s official publication,
Dabiq magazine. Dabiq is produced by IS’s Al-Hayat Media Center and
provides a venue for presenting the IS narrative to a global audience. As of
September 1, 2015, ten editions of Dabiq were available. Each edition of
10/3/2015
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Dabiq magazine was independently assessed for propaganda characteristics
as defined by the work of O’Shaughnessy et al. Each edition clearly meets
the definitional criteria of propaganda and demonstrates the characteristics
of the religious, political, and instrumental nucleuses.
Below are summaries of all ten published editions of Dabiq magazine.
The shortest edition, The Return of Khilafah, is 26 pages, and the longest
edition, From Hypocrisy to Apostasy, is 83 pages. For ease of analysis and
interpretation, the following describes each edition independently following
the three narrative components: audience, plot, and setting. Each edition of
Dabiq targets three primary audiences. The three audiences can roughly be
defined by their location. For IS-contiguous provinces, the audience is
primarily the local population. The second target audience is sympathetic
jihad groups. This element of the narrative is intended to gain their support
and expand the non-contiguous provinces. The third target audience is lone
wolf attackers. This group is primarily located in Western countries and
cannot otherwise participate in the Caliphate.
The primary plot element is the key component discussed in each
edition; generally, such elements are related to the title. In addition to
discrete plot elements, each edition contains consistent thematic narrative
elements. The first edition contains the narrative elements, and they provide
the framework for this analysis. The four elements are (1) jihad (holy war),
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(2) jamaah (governance), (3) tawhid (unity), and (4) hijrah (migration)
(Adnani 2014).
The opening remarks of every edition include a quote from IS’s
founding member, Abu Musab as-Zarqawi: “The Spark has been lit here in
Iraq and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it
burns the crusaders army in Dabiq.” The opening quote reinforces IS’s
ambition to draw Western powers into a broader regional conflict and
ultimately stage an apocalyptical battle in Northwestern Syria.
1. The Return of Khilafah: The primary plot element discussed in the first
edition of Dabiq is the religious authority and precedent for establishing a
Caliphate. In this edition, IS provides details and context to convince the
readership that its movement will be viewed historically as a true Caliphate.
It offers readers with a call to action to join the Caliphate and avoid the
blight of hypocrisy and apostasy. Within the text, IS compels followers to
migrate (hijrah) to the Caliphate, experience the glory of holy war (jihad),
join the family of the Caliphate (tawhid), and help establish a new
community (jamaah). It also furnishes step-by-step guidance for
establishing franchise organizations for followers unable to join the Caliphate
in Sham. The following are the steps laid out in the first edition of Dabiq:
(Step 1) Jihad – conduct destabilizing attacks and prevent the regime
from providing for its people; (Step 2) Jamaah – develop a sense of
community that coalesces around a common enemy; (Step 3) Tawhid
10/3/2015

Bixler - 15

– Establish a Caliphate and spread tawhid; (Step 4) Hijrah – move
forces to areas of ungoverned or politically unstable spaces. (Adnani
2014)
In the first edition, nearly every aspect of the content is set to Iraq and
Syria (Adnani 2014).
2. The Flood: The dominant plot element for the second edition of Dabiq
compares IS’s movement to the great flood. In Old Testament tradition, this
is a reference to Noah’s ark. In its analogy, IS associates the establishment
of a Caliphate to a flood meant to cleanse Earth. The Manichean worldview
offers room for only one religion. If you are not a follower of the Caliph, you
are an opponent. If you are an opponent, you are an apostate. Apostates are
valid targets for jihad. Their rejection of Islam is punishable by death. In this
edition, IS highlights numerous IS victories throughout Iraq in Syria. Aligned
with its stated mission, IS provides numerous examples of jihad, jamaah,
and tawhid and a select few examples of hijrah. In this edition, the
propensity of reporting is set in Iraq and Syria. Interestingly, IS includes a
specific call to action from individual followers who are abroad and unable to
migrate to Sham. IS offers guidance for followers to pledge their loyalty on
social media and conduct attacks in their home countries. The specified
locations for the attacks are the United States, Canada, Australia, France,
and any country supporting the war against IS.
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3. The Call to Hijrah: As the edition title suggests, the plot element
contained within the third edition is hijrah (migration) to IS. Much of the
discussion centers on the religious mandate to migrate to Sham and join the
jihad. IS makes significant appeals to an educated Western audience by
criticizing all educated Muslims, including doctors, lawyers, engineers,
bureaucrats. IS calls them hypocrites for dodging their obligation to engage
in jihad. IS gives educated Muslims an alternative option; if they migrate to
the Caliphate, they can serve the community in their current profession. IS
strengthens its appeal by highlighting the status of working-class slaves, a
status many disaffected minorities feel they occupy in modern societies. IS
makes it clear throughout this edition that its ambitions go far beyond
violence. IS is building a Caliphate and needs followers to establish a society
based on medieval interpretations of Sharia law.
This edition also marks
the American entry into the
fight on IS. IS draws an explicit
connection between U.S.
interventions and the
beheading of American
journalist James Foley. In IS’s
words, the killing of James
Foley was retaliation for U.S.
10/3/2015
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air support and interventions against IS operations in Iraq and Syria.
The setting for much of the third edition is the Halab wiliayats of Syria
from the perspective of the Syrian Army. The liberation of Halab includes
gaining control of the historically significant city of Dabiq. The city of Dabiq
is the namesake of the al-Hayat magazine and has significant meaning in the
IS narrative. Figure 3 depicts a rough location for Dabiq in northwest Syria,
in the Halab wiliayat, as described in this edition of Dabiq. Additionally,
Dabiq is referenced in historic Islamic texts, as the final battle between
Islam and Rome. Additionally, the city of Dabiq is explicitly identified by
founding member Abu Musab as-Zarqawi as the location IS will face the
crusading army (Adnani 2014).
4. The Failed Crusade: The primary plot of the fourth edition is the U.S.led coalition against IS. In the message, IS provides anecdotal evidence of
the destruction of the Pico-Sykes border separating Iraq and Syria. IS
highlights post-colonial structures, treaties, and puppet governments as
primary points of grievance. In this edition, and several subsequent editions,
IS denounces the Pico-Sykes border as a conspiratorial plot to weaken Arab
unity and instill human-made governments.
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In this edition, IS introduces a new geographic component to its
establishment of a state. In the fourth edition, IS announces the formation
of two new administrative
boundaries called wiliayats,
which are similar to
provinces. In the
vernacular IS refers to
administrative areas as
wiliayats. The two new
wiliayats are represented in
Figure 4 and are located in
Western Iraq. The new

Two New Wiliayats: Furat and Fallujah
Figure 4

Dabiq Magazine

wiliayats, Furat and Fallujah, are what would be considered contemporary
al-Anbar province in Iraq. IS includes in the text a description of the areas
encompassed by the new administrative boundary. Establishing new
provinces is IS’s method of emphasizing the destruction of post-colonial
geographic boundaries.
The setting for most of this edition is Iraq and Syria. Thematically, IS
provides significant detail on battles and victories in Iraq and Syria. Most
significantly, IS justifies with visceral hatred its victories against the against
the Yazidi peoples near Mount Sinjar. In its interpretation, the Yezidis are a
devil-worshiping cult, and IS must exterminate them. IS devotes several
10/3/2015
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pages to providing religious justification for the genocide and enslavement of
IS’s captives and characterizes U.S. intervention as futile.
5. Remaining and Expanding: The plot of the fifth edition of Dabiq
devotes particular emphasis to IS’s continued expansion. From IS’s
perspective, the organization is still winning the tactical and strategic war.
The conflict in Iraq and Syria has served as a battle cry for the Muslim world
to coalesce and mobilize.
IS has
received and
accepted
pledges of
loyalty from
numerous
jihadist
organizations
around the
region. Figure
5 depicts the

Islamic State Non-Contiguous Wiliayats
Figure 5

Dabiq Magazine

countries of origin for incoming pledges, predominantly in the Middle East
and North Africa. IS has accepted pledges of loyalty from organizations in
the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. Throughout the
fifth edition, examples of each of the four narrative elements are present in
10/3/2015

Bixler - 20

all of the newly proclaimed franchised wiliayats. The edition closes with the
taking of credit for three lone wolf attacks. IS asserts that the terrorist
attacks in Australia, Canada, and New York were inspired by IS’s call to
action in the second edition of Dabiq. At this point, IS has demonstrated
significant control within the contiguous boundaries of its state in Iraq and
Syria, expansion to non-contiguous wiliayats throughout the region, and a
global presence through the use of attributed lone wolf attacks (Adnani
2014).
6. Al-Qa'idah of Waziristan: The plot for the sixth edition of Dabiq
deviates slightly from previous editions’ narrative elements. In this edition,
IS devotes nearly half of the content and commentary to challenging AQ
ideology and actions. Much of the grievances form open challenges to AQ
leaders and AQ actions in Afghanistan and Yemen. The core grievance
centers on the fact that AQ has had a presence in those locations for years
and has never attempted to establish Sharia law. AQ has primarily devoted
its resources to self-preservation and plotting external attacks.
On the surface, AQ and IS may seem like very similar organizations
with similar tactics and objectives. However, from an insider’s standpoint,
they are ideologically incapable of cooperation. IS views the establishment of
a Caliphate, along with the jamaah requirements, as being of paramount
importance. IS openly and willingly declares war on anyone that is opposed
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to its doctrine. In contrast, AQ primarily views Western intervention as its
number one priority, which is external jihad against the West.
Paradoxically, the inclination and desire to attack Western targets is
how IS starts this edition. Similar to the fifth edition, IS takes credit for
declared acts of terror around the world. In this case, it is taking credit for
additional attacks in Australia and France. In both instances, the actions are
praised by IS as being dedicated forms of tawhid and pledges of loyalty to
the Caliph.
7. From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The seventh edition narrative describes
the transition of hypocrisy to apostasy. IS discusses the disappearance of
the “gray zone” as it relates to the establishment of a Caliphate. In general
terms, it is dividing the Arab community into two camps: those who support
the Caliphate and those who do not. Those who do not are officially guilty of
apostasy. In IS’s interpretation, apostasy is a crime punishable by death.
The play on words allows for repentance from individuals who were not quick
to join. IS suggests that not living under Sharia law previously made one a
hypocrite. Now that people have the option to affiliate themselves with the
Caliphate, they are apostates if they do not. The seventh edition devotes
several sections to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France. Since the
perpetrator of those attacks officially proclaimed loyalty to IS, this is a huge
media victory. For this particular event, IS leaves no ambiguity about
whether it was a random act of violence or an inspired act. This edition, like
10/3/2015
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the previous editions, hits on all four elements of the narrative and
demonstrates sufficient spatial diversity. The edition includes numerous
interviews from fighters who have immigrated to Sham, pledging loyalty
from Pakistan, and conducting attacks around the world (Adnani 2014).
8. Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa: For the eighth edition of Dabiq, the
primary plot element
present is the rejection
of secularism,
nationalism, and
patriotism. Thematically
throughout this 68-page
periodical, IS condemns
post-colonial structures
as un-Islamic. IS

Two New Wiliayats: Jazirah and Dijla
Figure 6

Dabiq Magazine

specifically discusses the
necessity to erase the Pico-Sykes border separating Iraq and Syria and the
expulsion of tribal influence. Like the previous three editions, IS has devoted
print space to taking credit for terrorist attacks, in this case in Denmark,
Tunisia, and Yemen. In its interpretation, this is another example of the
rejection of nationalism. It is clear from the context of the message that the
notion of attacking targets abroad is well within the scope of its goals. In this
edition, IS announces two more wiliayats within the contiguous boundaries.
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The new divisions will enable IS leadership to better administer jamaah for
the people of norther Iraq. Figure 6 depicts the two new wiliayats, Jazirah
and Dijla, as IS describes in this edition of Dabiq. In addition to evidence
that it is expanding its sphere of control within its contiguous borders, IS
continues to gain tawhid from outside the area. The most recent and
significant addition of tawhid comes from Nigeria. Boko Haram has pledged
loyalty to IS and continues its murderous rampage across Western Africa
(Adnani 2014).
9. They Plot and Allah Plots: The primary narrative plot element IS
discusses in the ninth edition revolves around conspiracy theories. The
fundamental argument is that conspiracy theories are an excuse to neglect
the duties of jihad. IS goes further than in previous editions in discussing
nationalism, secularism, and patriotism. In this edition, it takes a historical
look at the post-World War I boundaries of Pico-Sykes. In its view, the
establishment of the border separating Iraq and Syria is a core grievance of
the Caliphate. IS has gone to great lengths to erase all meaningful
enforcement of the border and redraw new provincial boundaries.
In line with previous editions, IS has taken credit for and affiliated
itself with the art show shooters in Texas. It justifies and commends the
attackers for defending the mocking of the prophet Mohammed. For the
ninth edition, IS takes an inward look and reports more on Iraq and Syria
than in the last six editions. A significant amount of reporting in this edition
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focuses on the deliberate liberation of the Yarmuk Camp in Dimashq wiliayat
in southern Syria. It documents the liberation battle, alliances, and postliberation conditions on the ground. Lastly, in the ninth edition, IS dedicates
several sections to highlighting the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. and Western
powers’ alliance against IS (Adnani 2014).
10. The Laws of Allah or the Laws of Men: In the tenth edition of Dabiq,
the common narrative theme is jamaah through the enforcement of Sharia
law. IS dedicates more than half of the text to comparing its medieval
interpretation and enforcement of Sharia law to that of contemporaries. It
challenges the authenticity and desire of the current rulers on their lack of
enforcement and provides numerous examples of how and where IS is
enforcing Sharia law.
It also dedicates several sections within the text to criticizing its
opposition. IS expresses particular religious and political grievances against
the Kurdish resistance forces and declares the Kurdish resistance apostates.
Its harshest judgments attack the Kurdish affiliation with socialism and
communism. IS further attacks the populist resistance movement for its
historic and current alignment with a nationalist agenda. That nationalist
agenda is wholesale written off as apostasy and further justification of IS’s
jihad against that resistance movement.
Like previous editions, the tenth edition of Dabiq announces the
pledging of loyalty, acceptance, and establishment of a new wiliayat. The
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new wiliayat is in the Caucasus mountain region of Dagestan and will be
called Qawqaz. Numerous jihadist organizations from this region have
pledged loyalty to IS. However, beyond pledges of loyalty and the
establishment of a wiliayat, IS reports very little in Dabiq.
Lastly, this edition of Dabiq comments on an event described as
Bloody Sunday. Based on the context, IS takes credit for coordinating three
near simultaneous attacks in one day. The attacks took place in France,
Tunisia, and Kuwait. All three attacks were designed to inflict casualties
against citizens of countries that are supporting the fight against IS.
Thematically, this seems to be in line with IS’s jihad narrative element,
identifying civilians as legitimate targets for terrorist activities (Adnani
2014).
Research Methods
Common to all ten editions of Dabiq are affirmative indications of
propaganda elements and the thematic use of a religious-based mobilization
narrative. The classification of narrative elements provided in the first edition
of Dabiq will serve as a framework for classifying the text in each of the ten
editions. The classification of narrative elements will allow for the
development of a data dictionary and rules for data capture for each of the
four narrative terms: jihad, jamaah, tawhid, and hijrah.
Figure 7 depicts a data dictionary to associate synonymous terms to
the narrative elements. Each narrative element included in the database
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must have an identifiable spatial reference. Identifiable spatial references
can be
explicit or
implicitly
derived from
the context.
Data entries
representing
more than
one location
or more than

Narrative Element

Data Dictionary

Hijrah

Migration, joining the
fight, presence of foreign
fighters, linguistics,
families’ moving,
occupation
Jamaah
Governance, law
enforcement, taxation,
education, administration,
public services, charity
Tawhid
Unity, pledges of loyalty,
brotherhood, friendship,
martyrs, repenting
Jihad
Liberation, attacks,
combat, post-combat
carnage, pre-combat
training
Narrative Element Data Dictionary

one narrative
element will

Figure 7

Dabiq Magazine

be duplicated. Data entries must have an explicit or implicitly derived
temporal aspect. Narrative elements quoted from historic Islamic texts, such
as the Quran or Haditha will not be included in the database.
The narrative element database from the 10 editions of Dabiq yielded
766 data points, which will facilitate quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Since each data point has a temporal, spatial, and contextual component,
the data will support a range of analytical techniques.
Dabiq is a primary data source published by IS’s media arm. The
results of the data provide insight into the most important narrative
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components for IS’s message, the most valuable locations, and the
correlation of location to narrative elements. Assessing narrative elements
offers a quantitative metric to aid in identifying the most valuable narrative
elements from an IS perspective. Mapping the narrative elements furnishes
insight into which narrative elements are occurring when and where.
Results
Quantifying Narrative Components
Starting with narrative
elements, the data were
collated to provide a
visualization of the importance
of IS locations for each of the
elements. Figure 8 displays
the narrative identifying jihad
as the dominant element with
35% of the narrative. The

Narrative Element by Frequency
Figure 8

Dabiq Magazine

second most common element reflecting the priority for sense of community
and rule of law is jamaah at 29% of the narrative. In a close third, at 28%,
is tawhid, reflecting IS’s value of brotherhood and unity among followers. In
a somewhat surprising last place, occupying 8%, is hijrah. Hijrah is the
narrative element that necessitates migration to join the Caliphate.
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Given the Western media hype of the number of foreign fighters
migrating to join IS, it is somewhat surprising that hijrah is by far the least
accounted for narrative element in Dabiq. The anecdotal evidence present in
Dabiq of hijrah primarily takes the form of rare interviews of recent
immigrants and commemorations of foreign martyrs. The significantly low
value on hijrah potentially indicates that IS’s strength comes from
indigenous support and alliances within the jihadist community, not wholly
from individual immigration.
Narrative Analysis by Geographic
Location
Quantifying narrative elements across
geography provides analytical insight into
the intrinsic value of a specific location.
Figure 9 breaks down the 766 data points
across the globe to identify a baseline of
geographic importance to the narrative. As
expected, Iraq and Syria dominate the
geographic setting in terms of narrative

Country
Frequency
Syria
276
Iraq
273
Egypt
35
Pakistan
34
Libya
32
Yemen
28
Dangastan
22
Saudi
Arabia
15
Algeria
12
Nigeria
12
France
6
America
5
Tunisia
5
Denmark
4
Kuwait
3
Canada
2
Philippines
1
total
766

elements. Iraq has 276 data points; in a

Frequency by Country

close second is Syria, with 273 data points.

Figure 9

Dabiq

The remaining countries represent non-contiguous IS-affiliated wiliayats. In
order of priority, they are Egypt (35), Pakistan (34), Libya (32), Yemen (28),
10/3/2015

Bixler - 29

Dagestan (22), Saudi Arabia (18), Algeria (12), and Nigeria (12). From the
evaluation of these data points, IS likely views the contiguous wiliayats
within Iraq and Syria as most valuable. Further, IS likely views the official
non-contiguous wiliayats across the Middle East and North Africa as on the
second tier of importance. This analysis is consistent with the calls to action
outlined in the first and second edition of Dabiq. The first call to action
compelled adherents to immigrate to the Caliphate, wage jihad, and
establish jamaah and tawhid. The reproach for not conducting hijrah was to
pledge loyalty to the Caliph and start a franchise node in one’s home
country.
Further geographic analysis of the narrative elements is possible
across Iraq and Syria. In nearly every case, the narrative element data
capture process allowed for an analysis at the wiliayat level. Since the
overall value to the narrative for Iraq and Syria are nearly equal, each will
be assessed independently. Figure 10 illustrates the narrative distribution
within Iraq. The Ninewa wiliayat had 126 associated data points, which is by
far the highest frequency of data points in Iraq. The city of Mosul is the
secondary capital for IS and lies in the Ninewa wiliayat. Adding a layer of
complexity to the analysis, IS has divided the contemporary Iraqi province of
Ninewa into three IS wiliayats: Ninewa (126), Dijla (10), and Jazirah (17).
The declaration of the two new administrative wiliayats did not come until
the eighth edition of Dabiq. It is nearly impossible to determine prior to the
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declaration where exactly the data fall. For continuity of analysis, all three
wiliayats will be grouped for analysis but assessed as independent. Similarly,
the contemporary Iraqi province of Anbar was divided in the fourth edition of
Dabiq. The new administrative wiliayats associated with Anbar are Furat and
Fallujah. The three wiliayats will be combined for visual analysis and
Province Frequency
Ninewa
126
Anbar
27
Salahuddin
21
Fallujah
19
Jazirah
17
Baghdad
16
Furat
14
Diyala
10
Kirkuk
10
Janub
8
Dijla
5
total
273
Frequency of Narrative
Elements: Iraq
Figure 10

Dabiq

assessed independently. Anbar has the
second-highest number of narrative element
data points at 26 with the addition of Furat
(14) and Fallujah (19). The remaining Iraqi
wiliayats in order are Salahuddin (21),
Bagdad (16), Diyala (10), Kirkuk (10), and
Janub (8). Both Bagdad and Janub are in
Shia-dominated areas of Iraq, so IS’s claim
of control is likely aspirational. The number
of narrative element data points reflects a

combination of activity through jihad and control through jamaah.

10/3/2015

Bixler - 31

Figure 11 illustrates the narrative distribution within Syria. The Raqqah
wiliayat had 105 associated data points, the highest in Syria. The city of
Province
Frequency
Raqqah
105
Halab
88
Barakah
38
Dimashq
20
Kahir
15
Homs
10
Total
276
Frequency of Narrative
Elements: Syria

Raqqah is the primary capital for IS and lies in

Figure 11 Dabiq

logistical standpoint, it makes analytical sense

the Raqqah wiliayat. The next highest
frequency of narrative components is attributed
to Halab wiliayat. Halab wiliayat is directly
adjacent to Raqqah and south of the Turkish
border. Purely from a homogeneity and

that Halab and Raqqah would have the highest raw count for narrative
components. The remaining Syrian wiliayats in descending order of
importance are Barakah (38), Dimashq (20), Kahir (15), and Homs (10).
The lower narrative element data capture in these areas likely indicates less
IS control and fewer activity areas. Additionally, each of those provinces
lacks major population centers under IS’s sphere of influence.
Temporal Visualization of Narrative Components
Within the database, a key data capture component was the Dabiq
edition number. The edition number corresponds with an Islamic calendar
date and provides a metric with which to conduct temporal analysis. The
edition number coupled with the primary narrative components and
geographic location provide a powerful visualization for analysis. The
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visualization coupled with the context of narrator, plot, and setting provide a
basis to make critical analytical judgments.

Narrative Element over Edition: Iraq
Figure 12

Dabiq

Starting with Iraq, in the first edition, all four narrative components
are readily identifiable. However, Figure 12 shows a clear narrative emphasis
on the components of jihad and tawhid. Based on the context, the key
information component is that the struggle in Iraq will lead to unity. In the
second and third editions, the primary narrative component is jamaah. This
is likely a reflection of the state of conditions on the ground. After the initial
onslaught of violence, IS’s priority became establishing governance and
instituting Sharia law. With the fourth edition, one observes a significant
spike in the narrative components of jihad and tawhid.
This is a reflection of extending the Caliphate into new areas of Iraq
and establishing new relationships. In the fifth edition, titled Remaining and
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Expanding, the narrative components bottom out across Iraq. The focus of
this edition is expanding the non-contiguous boundaries of the Caliphate to
new areas in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, the sixth edition is
outwardly focused, dedicating more space to discussing Afghanistan and the
conflict with AQ. In the seventh edition, the focus of Dabiq is addressing a
wide range of grievances and provides very little detail on the status of the
Caliphate. For the eighth, ninth, and tenth editions, one observes massive
spikes in the narrative components of jamaah and tawhid. In these editions,
the length of the publication has also increased significantly and the format
has been somewhat changed. IS is primarily interested in conveying its
moral high ground for establishing a Caliphate. In this context, it justifies
use of jihad for eliminating dissent and implementing effective
administration and legitimate governance. It dedicates significant content
space to describing the administration of courts, taxation, civil service, and
the resumption of medical student training.
As shown in Figure 13, in Syria, there is a notable lack of the narrative
element of hijrah. The remaining three narrative elements are represented,
with a notably high representation of jamaah. Given the context of Raqqah’s
being IS headquarters in Syria, IS likely put greater effort into establishing
governance early in the conflict. For the second edition, one observes a
significant spike in the mention of jihad. Analytically, this corresponds to the
main plot element and the desire to instill fear and passivism in the
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populace. Elevating the fear of retribution is likely a strategic move to quell
any thought of resistance to IS.
The concepts of hijrah and jihad spike in the third edition for Syria as a
point of comparison. During the same timeframe in Iraq, hijrah and jihad
have 50% less presence in Dabiq. Contextually, the quantitative analysis
supports the primary plot for the third edition, which is the call to hijrah. The

Narrative Element over Edition: Syria
Figure 13

Dabiq

discrepancy between Iraq and Syria in this instance is likely a function of
accessibility for immigrants to access Syria versus Iraq. For the fourth, fifth,
and sixth editions, all data points for Syria decrease significantly. The data
follow a very similar trend as the Iraqi data. Contextually, the decrease in
representation is related to the outward focus of IS in those three editions.
The narrative consideration focuses on the expansion of non-contiguous IS
wiliayats. For the seventh edition, one observes significant data spikes in
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jamaah and tawhid. This is likely a reflection of the primary plot and setting
elements in the seventh edition. They form an inward look and a
reinvigorated effort to encourage followers to move to Sham. The direction
IS takes to attain that objective is to de-emphasize the violence and
emphasize the administration of services and brotherhood. Interestingly, in
the eighth edition, one witnesses a sharp decrease in all reporting for Syria.
For the ninth and tenth editions, jamaah and jihad dominate the Syrian
narrative elements. The plot and setting elements for these data indicate
that IS is expanding its themes from the sixth edition and its objective is to
demonstrate legitimacy. It continues to provide examples of where it is
expanding and where and how it provides services. It is also noteworthy that
in the last three editions the length of the magazine and format for
presenting provincial level updates has changed.
Cartographic Visualization of Narrative Components
Cumulative Narrative Elements
This visualization aggregates all four narrative elements by geographic
frequency distributions and provides a foundation to identify the IS
narrative’s center of gravity. Within the contiguous boundaries of the
proclaimed Caliphate are signs of significant variance within the narrative.
The choropleth map in Figure 14 represents a three breaks quantile analysis
for all four narrative elements. The three breaks provide a relative metric
for assessing low, medium, and high levels for the recorded narrative
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elements by wiliayat. Within Dabiq, narrative element instances are

Cumulative Narrative Elements: 3 Breaks Quantile
Figure 14

Dabiq

significantly higher in the Ninewa, Raqqah, and Halab wiliayats. This
enumerated visualization is in agreement with data from the previous
analytical steps.
On the lower end of the enumeration are the wiliayats of Homs, Khair,
Dijla, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Janub. For the most part, these wiliayats lie on the
boundaries of the Caliphate and represent areas that are not fully under IS’s
control. The two exceptions are Khair and Dijla. Based on their proximity to
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Raqqah and Ninewah, they are likely underrepresented within the Dabiq
narrative elements. For Khair, the lower reporting is likely based on a
relatively lower and more sparsely settled region of the Caliphate. For Dijla,
the low reporting is likely explained by the late creation of the new wiliayat.
The new administrative boundary was not announced until the eighth edition
of Dabiq. In earlier editions, narrative elements in part targeting Dijla likely
targeted Ninewa as a whole.
Jihad as a Percentage of Total Reporting by Wiliayat
The narrative element jihad represents 35% of the topics covered in
Dabiq magazine. The data visualization in Figure 15 illustrates the narrative
element jihad as a percentage of total reporting across geography. This
allows one to analyze the data independently within each of the wiliayats.
For this analysis, 0-3% represents a relatively low number of reporting
events and 7-14% represents a relatively high number of reporting events.
The narrative element jihad is represented in the data dictionary as
liberation, attack, combat, post-combat carnage, and pre-combat training.
Within in the ten editions of Dabiq, IS has openly declared jihad against all
forms of resistance and apostasy. In its declared hostilities, it has included
Syrian government forces, Iraqi government forces, Kurdish resistance
forces, tribal militias, and generally any group that fails to pledge loyalty to
the Caliph.
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For the temporal context, the graphic provides insight into where the
preponderance of self-reported conflict has occurred to date. Similar to the
amalgamated visualization in Figure 14, the northern wiliayats have the
highest reported instances of jihad. In the context of its strongest resistance

Jihad as a Percentage of Total Reporting by Wiliayat
Figure 15

Dabiq

being Kurdish forces, it makes analytical sense for the most glorified combat
to occur in hotly contested territories.
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In this visualization, Anbar stands out as a potential anomaly. Several
geographic factors complicate this analysis. First, Anbar covers a massive
expanse of uninhabited desert. The majority of the population and IS
activities have likely occurred in the eastern portion of the wiliayat. Second,
in the ninth edition of Dabiq, IS reports multiple enduring engagements
among IS, Iraqi government forces, Shia militias, and Sunni tribal forces.
Finally, in the fourth edition, IS subdivides Anbar into three wiliayats: Anbar,
Furat, and Fallujah. For the first three editions, IS singularly attributes all
the activities in those areas to Anbar. The situation in Anbar is highly
contested. IS has not established enough security in the area to move to the
follow-on phases of establishing jamaah and tawhid.
The wiliayat of Janub also represents a potential anomaly. As a
percentage of total reporting, jihad is the most active narrative element in
Janub. Janub represents a nearly homogenous Shia population and lies far
outside of IS’s control, so the narrative element for Janub is jihad. For the
most part, the attacks in Janub are best described as hit and run tactics.
From this standpoint, IS has little interest in actually controlling Janub.
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Tawhid and Jamaah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat
As a natural evolution of attaining the ultimate goals of the Caliphate,

Tawhid and Jamaah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat
Figure 16

Dabiq

IS must establish governance and unity within its wiliayats. Viewed
independently, jamaah represents 29% of the total narrative, and tawhid
represents 28%. When spatially represented, the two elements are nearly
indistinguishable in their distribution. For visualization, the elements have
been combined for the contiguous IS wiliayats. For the visualization in Figure
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16, the sums of jamaah and tawhid have been displayed on a choropleth
map using natural breaks. This technique provides a raw count of the
combined narrative elements by wiliayat. The result is a revisualization that
likely represents IS’s control and absorption of a given population. Not
surprisingly, Halab, Raqqah, and Ninewa have the highest reported levels of
governance and unity. Wiliayats adjacent to those have the next highest.
The further one moves from Raqqah and Mosul, the less control IS has on
the local population.
The wiliayat Dimashq likely represents an anomaly. A significant
amount of reporting covered in the ninth edition of Dabiq is dedicated to
improvements of the Yarmuk Camp in Dimashq. The ninth edition is the only
time IS directly identifies Dimashq as an area of control. The liberation and
subsequent establishment of governance in Yarmuk is likely very limited in
duration. It is unlikely that IS has the ability to project influence that far
beyond its support bases in northern Syria.
Hijrah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat
The final narrative element visualized in Figure 17 represents the
totality of the IS narrative. As IS outlines in the third edition of Dabiq, hijrah
likely represents the full realization of the Caliphate. To maintain legitimacy
within jihadi circles, it must continue to grow. To grow, it must attract
immigrants to improve its ability to administer the newly gained territories.
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IS has gone to great lengths in its propaganda to portray the Caliphate as a
place of opportunity.
However, despite this emphasis and calls to action, hijrah only
represents 8% of the total narrative. That relatively small number can be

Figure 17

Hijrah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat

Dabiq

further isolated to areas that are under the highest level of control. Halab,
Raqqah, and Ninewa are the areas that have the highest anecdotal indication
of immigration. The anomalies indicated in Fallujah represent an analytical
judgment to dual-classify series of suicide bombings in the city of Ramadi as
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both jihad and hijrah. In reality, that likely fails to meet the desired intent
for attracting immigrants.
Conclusion
The geopolitical context predicating the rise of IS in Iraq and Syria is
nested in ethno-sectarian divisions. Ethno-sectarian divisions transcend the
contemporary political boundaries separating modern Iraq and Syria. IS has
realized its greatest military and governance success is in historically Sunnidominated areas. IS has faced the greatest organized resistance in areas
with a predominantly Kurdish population. IS has also faced resistance in
areas where the Shia-dominated governments of Iraq and Syria maintain
popular and military support.
IS’s primary venue for communicating its religious-based narrative to
the outside world is Dabiq magazine. As of September 1, 2015, IS has
published ten editions of Dabiq through the Al-Hayat Media Center. Each
edition of Dabiq reveals classic narrative elements Van Dijk described,
including audience, plot, and setting. The first edition of Dabiq outlines the
objectives of the magazine and provides a taxonomy for classifying IS’s
strategic narrative. The strategic narrative comprises four thematic
elements: jihad, jamaah, tawhid, and hijrah.
Each of the ten editions of Dabiq independently, and collectively,
meets the contemporary definition of Islamic propaganda as described by
Torres, including a religious, ideological, and political nucleus. Additionally,
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IS has mastered the “theater of terror” Bueno et al. described. IS has
effectively synchronized the timing and delivery of its narrative with highly
choreographed and heinous acts of violence. One of the best examples is the
release of the decapitation video of a U.S. reporter coinciding with the
declaration of jihad against the United States. Finally, IS has consistently
projected a view of a Manichean world as described by O’Shaughnessy et al.
Its messages consist of absolute elements and the apocalyptic inevitability of
a clash between “true” Islam and the West.
IS seemingly appeared out of nowhere in the summer of 2014 as an
unstoppable and rapidly advancing force in Iraq and Syria. The organization
was originally downplayed and characterized as an AQ JV team. In reality, IS
has had an enduring presence in the region, predating the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. The founding IS leadership had ideological and pragmatic associations
with AQ in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Barret describes, IS was nearly
destroyed by the end of the U.S. combat operations in Iraq in 2008. Since
2008, IS has continued to rebuild and refine its ambitions. Through its
propaganda and strategic narrative, IS has detailed its regional and global
ambitions. One of its clearest messages calls for the destruction of idolatry,
innovation, and post-colonial structures—specifically the Pico-Sykes border
between Iraq and Syria.
Assessing each edition of Dabiq reveals an ambitious framework to
establish and administer a Caliphate. The Caliphate has a three-tier spatial
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scale: the contiguous, non-contiguous, and global scale. At the contiguous
scale, IS has created administrative boundaries that supplant the Pico-Sykes
border dividing Iraq and Syria. The new boundaries intentionally span areas
of Iraq and Syria. The non-contiguous scale pertains to pledges of loyalty
and acceptance of franchise wiliayats across the Middle East and North
Africa. At the global scale, IS has reached out to a Western audience and
advocated for lone-wolf attacks in Western countries.
The taxonomy detailed in the first edition of Dabiq provides a
framework for quantitative and qualitative analysis of IS narrative elements.
Each of the narrative elements represents the four phases of IS expansion of
the Caliphate. In agreement with the steps outlined in Dabiq number one, it
is apparent through quantification that there is a sequencing priority within
the narrative elements. The first step for IS when entering a new area is to
extinguish resistance and dissention through jihad. Once it has dismantled
the current system, the next step is to implement jamaah and establish
tawhid. Finally, after these three conditions have been met, the Caliphate
becomes appealing for hijrah.
The classification, visualization, and analytical processes have revealed
spatial prioritizations to IS narrative elements. The results of the analysis
are most succinctly summarized by Tobler’s first law of geography. Based on
the visualization of the narrative elements, the wiliayats, starting with Halab
and extending east toward Ninewa, are the power centers for the Caliphate.
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The level of IS control decays precipitously across the contiguous wiliayats
the further they are removed from the state capital of Raqqah. The
anomalous visualization is caused by newly established administrative
boundaries. The new boundaries introduced in Iraq and Syria changed the
precision of the data and caused erroneous reporting. The visualization of
the IS narrative will eventually reflect greater control in Kahir, Jazirah,
Furat, Anbar, and Salah al-Din.
The classification, visualization, and analysis of the IS narrative
elements illuminate IS’s true intentions. IS has presented a religious-based
narrative to achieve pragmatic political goals. It has used religion as a basis
for justifying violence while taking tangible steps to realize the primary
political goal of destroying post-colonial structures, including the Pico-Sykes
border. Supplanting administrative boundaries and controlling territory on
both sides of the contemporary border is a systematic decision to change the
status quo.
Discussion
Removing veracity from the discourse, the IS narrative is an extremely
powerful tool for coalescing and mobilizing a globally restive Sunni
population. The IS narrative appeals primarily to an underrepresented and
often hopeless Sunni youth. In counterterrorism journals, scholars frequently
speculate that the attraction for Westerners would be jihadism as primarily
adventurism versus a religious mandate. The existence of IS provides a
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setting for unfolding the plot elements of the narrative. The narrative
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that fosters the Manichean worldview and
the inevitability of a clash of civilizations.
In practical terms, the veracity and authenticity of the IS narrative is a
moot point. Long after IS becomes a degraded and defeated military, its
narrative will persist. The actions it has set in motion will almost certainly
result in a multi-generational challenge for the entire region. The sectarian
underpinnings have further divided an already strained existence among the
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations throughout Iraq and Syria.
IS has realized tangible steps toward renunciation of post-colonial
structures. It has contributed to the destruction of the Syrian and Iraqi
governments. The Pico-Sykes border distinguishing those two countries has
at least been temporarily supplanted through the destruction of border
control points. IS has gone further and literally posed an alternative
administrative alignment through the creation of new wiliayats that straddle
the historic Pico-Sykes border.
The intensity of the Syrian civil war, the fierce resistance by Kurdish
forces, and the lack of unity in the Shia populace make it decreasingly likely
that post-colonial borders will survive. In the near term, conflict has
coalesced along ethnic and sectarian lines and will continue to define the
region. In the long term, those boundaries will likely recognize semiautonomous Sunni regions, Kurdish regions, and Shia regions.
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Areas for Further Research
The process of classifying, visualizing and analyzing the narrative
elements contained in Dabiq magazine is simply a starting point. IS’s media
wing has multiple venues for messaging a global audience for recruitment
and fundraising. The narrative element framework, data dictionary, and
analytical methodologies can be scaled to accommodate additional data
sources.
Applying the above analytical methodologies to regional media, social
media, and micro blogs would significantly improve verification of the IS
narrative. The inclusion of additional data sources would verify the
decentralized delivery of a unified message. The more coherent and
consistent the message remains across delivery platforms the more deeply
the community of interest has internalized the content.
Numerous social media data mining tools, such as mention map, hoot
sweet, and tweet deck, would provide venues for additional data discovery
and validation. For more analytically rigorous and reliable results,
commercially available or custom data mining should be developed. There
are numerous challenges with incorporating new data sources. Some of the
upfront concerns are associated with data precision. The data in the initial
model were only precise at the wiliayat level. Data provided from a
commercial social media data mining service would be georeferenced and
provide much greater detail. Regional accessibility to the Internet is also an
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analytical challenge. It is highly likely that the preponderance of IS narrative
reporting on social media would come from populated areas with services
such as electricity and Internet. Areas in the desert would go underreported.
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